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ABSTRACT: In this paper an attempt is made to show that meanings play an essential role in 
Påˆini’s grammar. This role is then found to consist in their being the input of the grammar. This, 
when accepted, seems to have as consequence that Påˆini’s grammar cannot, as a rule, generate 
single words. The smallest utterance that can be produced is, in general, the sentence. This last 
statement must be qualified on account of the kåraka device used by Påˆini. 
 
1.1.  Påˆini’s A∑†ådhyåy¥ contains about four thousand sËtras. In more than one 
thousand of them there is a reference to the meaning of the grammatical elements 
introduced or discussed (Pandit, 1974: 181). Moreover, the A∑†ådhyåy¥ is 
accompanied by a list of verbal roots, the Dhåtupå†ha, the meanings of which are 
given throughout. In another paper (Bronkhorst, 1981) I have argued that there are 
reasons to think that those meaning indicating words were there from the 
beginning. And if they were not there, they were understood. In the same paper I 
have also argued that in the list of nominal stems and other grammatical elements 
known as “Gaˆapå†ha”, meaning indicating words, though not expressed, are 
understood. 
 What role do those meanings play in the grammar? Three answers are 
conceivable: a.  They play no, or almost no role in it. b.  They are part of the 
output of the grammar; i.e. the grammar produces utterances together with an 
indication as to their meaning. c.  They are the input of the grammar; i.e., on the 
basis of a meaning that is to be expressed, the grammar produces an appropriate 
utterance. 
 All the three possible answers are represented in the literature. As a rule 
they are presented as dogmatic assertions. The first view, that meanings play no, 
or virtually no, role in Påˆini’s grammar, is accepted by Roodbergen (1974: 
Introduction, p. ii), and also by Misra (1966: 110-1; see also 1966: 17-8). Thieme 
(1932: 236-7 [524-5]) may be counted among those who assign a very 
subordinate role to meanings. 
 The second view, that the meanings of the utterances produced by the 
grammar are themselves part of the output, is most sparsely met with in the 
literature. It is found in Joshi (1969: 16-7), where he says about the rules on [147] 
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syntax that they “utilize the words produced by the wordproducing rules and 
offer… semantic interpretation of the sentence”. It may be noted that this 
statement is not about Påˆini’s grammar as a whole, but about the rules on syntax 
in the same. 
 The third view, that meanings are the input of Påˆini’s grammar, is clearly 
adopted by Buiskool (1939: 16) where he states that “the task Påˆini imposes 
upon himself, is to give as completely as possible a record of the language he 
intends to describe, in fixing accurately the sound-symbols that correspond to a 
(sic) particular psychological contents.” Unfortunately, Buiskool specifies those 
psychological contents in a way that is incompatible with Påˆini’s grammar. The 
same point of view, but now restricted to certain parts of the grammar, is 
represented by Kiparsky and Staal (1969: 84) and van Nooten (1969: 244). 
 All the authors mentioned above, with only one exception, merely posit 
their view regarding the role of meanings in the A∑†ådhyåy¥. The exception is van 
Nooten, to whose arguments we shall pay attention in subsection 1.3, where more 
evidence from Påˆini’s grammar will be produced to show that possibility c is to 
be preferred to b. In 1.2 it will be shown that possibility a can be discarded. §2, 
finally, will deal with an important consequence of the outcome of §1. 
 
1.2.  It seems clear that interpretations of the A∑†ådhyåy¥ that give meanings their 
share are to be preferred to interpretations that do not. I shall none the less 
mention two more reasons why we must accept that meanings play a very 
important role in Påˆini’s grammar. In both cases I shall be brief, referring the 
reader to the relevant literature for further details. 
 Joshi and Roodbergen (1973: Introduction, pp. ii-iv) point out that P. 
2.2.1-5 are superfluous in the sense that the forms derived with their help can also 
be obtained without them. The two authors conclude that the rules P. 2.2.1-5 are 
in all probability later interpolations. Cardona (1977) objects to this conclusion, 
rightly I think. He shows that the forms for the formation of which P. 2.2.1-3, 5 
are used can be obtained without these rules, it is true, but they will then not 
express the same meanings.  The choice is therefore between dropping rules 
from the A∑†ådhyåy¥ and accepting the importance of meanings. Obviously our 
preference must go to the second alternative. (See also Cardona, 1976: 159-60.) 
                                                                                                                                
* I like to thank Jim Benson, who criticized an earlier draft of this paper and suggested stylistic 
improvements. 
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 Renou (1955: 111-2) mentions a number of nipåtana-sËtras which introduce 
ready-made forms that, Renou thinks, could very easily have been introduced 
analytically. One such ready-made form is ugraµpaßya (P. 3.2.37). The 
immediately preceding rule introduces asËryaµpaßya, but analytically (P. 3.2.36: 
asËryalalå†ayor d®ßitapo˙). What Renou does not seem to notice is this. P. 3.2.36 
prescribes the affix khaß (anuv®tti from rule 28) in the sense kart® (P. 3.4.67) to 
[148] the root d®ß when the upapada is asËrya and expresses the karman (anuv®tti 
of karmaˆi from rule 22). In this way asËryaµpaßya comes to mean “who sees not 
the sun” (sËryaµ na paßyanti, as the Kåßikå has it; not “one not seen by the sun”, 
as Chattopadhyay (1967: 536) tells us. A similar derivation would ascribe to 
ugraµpaßya the meaning “who sees (something) fierce”, instead of “fierce-
looking” which it really means. (This is the meaning Monier-Williams ascribes to 
ugrapaßya. See also the Nyåsa on this rule (part II, p. 566): ugrampaßyeti/ 
karmaˆy aˆ iti pråpte d®ße˙ khaß nipåtyate/ and the Padamañjar¥ on the same (part 
II, p. 566): ugraµ paßyat¥ti/ kriyåviße∑aˆam etat.) An analytic description of 
ugraµpaßya would therefore require adjustment of meaning-conditions. Påˆini 
saved himself that trouble by introducing ugraµpaßya as a nipåtana. 
 Renou further mentions bhuja and nyubja (P. 7.3.61), and prayåja and 
anuyåja (P. 7.3.62). The fact that these words are given ready-made can again be 
explained by the circumstance that the special meanings of these terms could not 
be easily arrived at analytically. (Renou seems to admit this in the case of prayåja 
and anuyåja when he says: “cités comme mots techniques, sans doute”.) Further 
examples are discussed by Bhattacharya (1966: 107-8; 110-2). Bhattacharya 
(1966: 103) also quotes a verse (without mentioning its source), in which it is 
stated that the purpose of certain nipåtanas is to specify meaning. It reads: 
apråpte˙ pråpaˆaµ cåpi pråpter våraˆam eva ca/ adhikårthavivak∑å ca trayam etan 
nipåtanåt//. 
 This much suffices to show that meanings play an essential role in Påˆini’s 
grammar. We therefore discard possibility a. 
 
1.3.  We are now faced with the remaining two possibilities. Either meanings are 
the input of Påˆini’s grammar, or they are part of its output. In a way the two 
alternatives are diametrically opposed to each other. At the same time both do full 
justice to the meanings in the A∑†ådhyåy¥ and its appendices. It is therefore hard 
to see how one could choose between them. 
 Van Nooten (1969: 244) made an attempt to prove that “meaning statements 
are on the whole not of the type: ‘element a means x’, but rather: ‘to express the 
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notion x, use element a’.” Van Nooten’s procedure is to show that rules which 
introduce suffixes are arranged according to meaning, rather than according to the 
suffixes involved. 
 Van Nooten’s attempt cannot but be deemed laudable. That the nature of the 
evidence he adduces does not make his arguments as compelling as one might 
wish, does not detract from this. Cardona’s (1976: 186) comment, which says that 
“what van Nooten has tried to prove was well known before…”, is therefore 
extremely unfair. The question is not what scholars think, or think they know, but 
on what grounds they hold their beliefs. Before van Nooten they had no grounds 
whatever for the opinions they had regarding the role of meanings in the 
A∑†ådhyåy¥ (or at any rate they never showed they had any); van Nooten tried to 
give them some. 
[149] There is a better reason than van Nooten’s to accept that meanings are the 
input of Påˆini’s grammar. It is based on the existence in the A∑†ådhyåy¥ of the 
so-called “one name section”. This section covers the rules P. 1.4.1 to 2.2.38 and 
begins in the following fashion: 
P. 1.4.1 å ka∂aråd ekå saµjñå “Up to (the rule) P. 2.2.38 (only) one name (is to be 
assigned).” P. 1.4.2 viprati∑edhe paraµ kåryam “In case of conflict (the rule) 
which follows (in the order in which the rules occur in this book) must be made 
(to take effect).” It is not our concern to determine whether P. 1.4.2 exerts its 
influence in the whole of the A∑†ådhyåy¥ or in the section specified in P. 1.4.1 
only. Certain is that it exerts its influence in the “one name section”. 
 I shall now discuss an example of the working of P. 1.4.2, hereby following 
Cardona (1970: 43-4). Take the sentence dhanu∑å vidhyati “He pierces with 
(arrows shot from) a bow.” Here a bow is the instrument (karaˆa) of the action of 
piercing, if only indirectly, through the arrows. It is also the point from which 
(apådåna) arrows are shot. The names “instrument” (karaˆa) and “point from 
which” (apådåna) are given to the bow by P. 1.4.42 (sådhakatamaµ karaˆam) and 
P. 1.4.24 (dhruvam apåye ’pådånam) respectively. Both these rules lie in the “one 
name section”. As a result of P. 1.4.1 only one of the two names can be given to 
the bow. P. 1.4.2 takes care that the bow is called only “instrument” (karaˆa), not 
“point from which” (apådåna). Consequently only the sentence dhanu∑å vidhyati 
is produced (with the help of P. 2.3.18) and not the incorrect sentence *dhanu∑o 
vidhyati (by P. 2.3.28). 
 This example illustrates the working of P. 1.4.2. But this illustration 
presupposes that meanings are the input of Påˆini’s grammar. For suppose that 
the opposite is true, that meanings are part of the output of the grammar, 
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accompanying the utterances produced by the same. In that case the sentence 
dhanu∑å vidhyati might be produced at one time or another, together with the 
information that the bow is the means par excellence (sådhakatama) of piercing. 
But the information that this same bow is also a “point from which” would not in 
any way be conveyed. What is more, P. 1.4.2 would not have any role to play in 
this derivation. The rules P. 1.4.24 and P. 1.4.42 cannot come in conflict as long 
as it is not known that our bow is to be both instrument and point from which, i.e. 
as long as we do not know what meanings are to be conveyed. Until then, indeed 
as long as we are waiting for those rules to supply us with this information, the 
rules apply in turn, producing both dhanu∑å vidhyati and the undesired *dhanu∑o 
vidhyati. Generalizing a bit, it can be said that the presence of rules which assign 
kåraka names in the “one name section” cannot be explained, when we think that 
meanings are part of the output in Påˆini’s grammar. 
 If, on the other hand, we assume that meanings are the input of Påˆini’s 
grammar, the above example is not problematic in any way. In that case both the 
meanings “point from which” and “means par excellence” are part of [150] the 
input. As a result there is conflict between P. 1.4.24 and P. 1.4.42. The former of 
these two rules would assign the name apådåna, the latter the name karaˆa. P. 
1.4.2 brings it about that P. 1.4.42 wins. We note that the undesired sentence 
*dhanu∑o vidhyati is not produced, quite simply because no semantic input occurs 
in which the bow is merely the point from which, and not simultaneously means 
par excellence. The same circumstance, incidentally, prevents the grammar from 
producing sentences like vahninå siñcati “he sprinkles with fire”. 
 More examples of the role of P. 1.4.2 in the realm of the kårakas have been 
given by Cardona (1974: 234-6). They all support the conclusion of this first 
section: Påˆini’s grammar turns meanings into utterances.  
 
2.1.  The conclusion of §1 seems to have the following consequence: Påˆini’s 
grammar does not, as a rule, produce single words; it produces, as a rule, larger 
utterances. The reason is that, as a rule, no meanings can be found which, by 
means of Påˆini’s grammar, give rise to single words. The remainder of this 
section will support and specify these statements. 
 In what follows, I shall call “semantic elements” the meanings which are 
foun, or understood, in the A∑†ådhyåy¥ and its appendices. They will be printed 
between hooks (<>) where they occur. Our first task is to find out what semantic 
elements underlie the utterances which we are going to study. I write down the 
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derivations in a way which is self-explanatory, and which shows which semantic 
elements play a role, and where. 
 First bhËyate, 3rd Sing. Pres. Pass. of the root bhË “be”: 
 
1. bhË Dhp. I.1 <sattå> 
2. bhË-lAÈ 3.4.69 <bhåva>; 3.2.123 <vartamåna> 
3. bhË-ta 3.4.78; 1.4.22 <eka> 
4. bhË-yaK-ta 3.1.67 
5. bhË-ya-te 3.4.79 
 
The semantic elements which play a role in this derivation are <sattå>, <bhåva>, 
<vartamåna> and <eka>. These semantic elements and bhËyate therefore belong 
together, the latter giving expression to the former. Nothing more than this set of 
semantic elements is required to obtain the word bhËyate. 
 In passing we observe that one set of semantic elements may give rise to 
several utterances. A concrete instance is the set {<sattå>, <bhåva>, <åßis>, 
<eka>} which can give rise to three utterances: bhavi∑¥∑†a, bhåvi∑¥∑†a and 
bhËyatåm. For reasons of space we cannot enter into the details of the derivations. 
We note that these same utterances could have [151] been arrived at on the basis 
of the set {<bhË>, <bhåva>, <eka>, <åßis>}. Generalizing we can say that one 
utterance can be the expression of more than one set of semantic elements. 
 Until now we could assign sets of semantic elements to single words. This 
changes in the next example, tvaµ bhavasi. 
 
1. yu∑mad <yu∑mad> 
2. yu∑mad-bhË Dhp. I.1 <sattå> 
3. yu∑mad-bhË-lAÈ 3.4.69; 1.4.54 <svatantra>; 3.2.123 <vartamåna> 
4. yu∑mad-bhË-siP 3.4.78; 1.3.78; 1.4.22 <eka> 
5. yu∑mad-sU-bhË-si 4.1.2; 1.4.22 <eka> 
etc.  
 
This derivation shows that the utterance tvaµ bhavasi gives expression to the set 
{<yu∑mad>, <sattå>, <svatantra>, <vartamåna>, <eka>}. The question is now: 
what semantic elements underlie the separate words tvam and bhavasi? 
 This question can easily be answered for the word tvam. It gives expression 
to <yu∑mad> and <eka>. Be it noted that in deriving tvam use must be made of P. 
2.3.46: pråtipadikårthali∫gaparimåˆavacanamåtre prathamå. The sËtra is here not 
interpreted in accordance with the tradition, but following Speyer (1886: 26, note 
1): “The first case serves only to signify the gender and number of the thing 
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designated by the word’s rude form or pråtipadika.” See also Thieme, 1956: 1-10 
(= 1971: 573-82). 
 What semantic elements underlie bhavasi? Perhaps what remains after 
subtracting <yu∑mad> and <eka> from the set underlying tvaµ bhavasi? Neither 
these three semantic elements, nor indeed any other set of semantic elements can 
generate the single word bhavasi. The reason is that in order to generate bhavasi 
we not only need semantic elements, but we must also know that yu∑mad is 
upapada, and that yu∑mad and the verbal ending refer to the same thing. The rule 
which contains these requirements is P. 1.4.105: yu∑mady upapade 
samånådhikaraˆe sthåniny api madhyama˙ “When yu∑mad is the attendant word 
(upapada), also when only understood, [and when this word yu∑mad] refers to the 
same thing (samånådhikaraˆa), [the endings called] madhyama [are employed].” 
We conclude that without tvam the word bhavasi cannot be generated. In this we 
agree with Hari D¥k∑ita, who wrote in his B®hacchabdaratna (p. 113): na hi 
padåntaranirapek∑am eva padam iha ßåstre saµskåryam iti niyama˙/ yu∑mady 
upapade ityåder asa∫gatiprasa∫gåt/. 
 Our conclusion is in need of some specification. The single word bhavasi 
can be generated in case the word tvam is understood but not expressed. The 
words sthåniny api “also when merely understood” in P. 1.4.105 provide [152] for 
this. But this circumstance merely emphasizes that the single word bhavasi as it 
occurs in tvaµ bhavasi cannot be generated. 
 The above arguments, which show quite generally that finite verbs with 
endings of the 2nd person cannot be produced in isolation by Påˆini’s grammar, 
apply virtually unchanged to finite verbs with endings of the 1st person. (See P. 
1.4.107.) Are they also valid for the 3rd person? 
 I think they are valid for certain finite verbs with 3rd person endings. P. 
1.4.108 reads: ßeße prathama˙ “In the remaining cases the endings of the 3rd 
person.” The remaining cases are those cases where neither yu∑mad nor asmad are 
the attendant words, that is to say, 1 where a word other than yu∑mad and asmad 
is the attendant word, and 2 where there is no attendant word. We have met a case 
where there is no attendant word (that refers to the same thing) in bhËyate. A 
word other than yu∑mad or asmad is the attendant word of finite verbs like 
bhavati. We know that words like bhËyate can be produced in isolation. Clearly 
words like bhavati cannot. 
 
2.2.  It is not possible to get a clear picture of how large groups of words are 
produced by Påˆini’s grammar without paying attention to the kåraka device. I 
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shall therefore first give a short, indeed sketchy, characterization of this device. 
My characterization is closest to Cardona’s description of the same, if I have 
understood his expositions correctly. See esp. Cardona, 1967 and 1974; also 
Joshi, 1974. 
 Until now we have only met semantic elements which either directly gave 
rise to a grammatical element, or contributed to the production of such a 
grammatical element. (There are also semantic elements which do not in any way 
give rise to a grammatical element. An instance is <k∑epa> “abuse”, in the 
derivation of kha†vårË∂ha. The semantic element <k∑epa> brings it about that 
kha†våm is compounded with the following participle. See P. 2.1.26.) The 
difficulty with case-endings is this, that no seven meanings are so obliging as to 
correspond clearly to the seven groups of case-endings. Six of these groups of 
case-endings are as a rule expressive of a relationship with the verb, one, the 
genitive case-ending, is usually not. Further specification of meanings meets with 
difficulties. 
 What Påˆini does to make the situation easier to handle is this. He 
introduces “pseudo-meanings” which do show the required correspondence with 
case-endings. It is obvious that no one-to-one relation can exist between these 
pseudo-meanings and the less accommodating “real” meanings. Indeed, at times 
totally different real meanings converge into one pseudo-meaning. So the real 
meanings karmaˆå yam abhipraiti (P. 1.4.32) and priyamåˆa˙ (P. 1.4.33), as well 
as ¥psita˙ (P. 1.4.36) and others, are bundled together in the one pseudo-meaning 
sampradåna. Or one real meaning can turn into several pseudo-meanings, 
depending on the context. For example, the real meaning yaµ prati kopa˙ can 
become sampradåna (P. 1.4.37) as well as karman (P. 1.4.38). 
[153] Even after introducing pseudo-meanings some irregularities remain. They 
are of three kinds: 
 1.  Sometimes two different case-endings can be used to express exactly the 
same thing in the same context. There is, for example, no difference in meaning 
between stokena mukta˙ and stokån mukta˙; see P. 2.3.33. In such cases two 
case-endings correspond to one pseudo-meaning. 
 2.  A normal passive-active transformation turns a nominative case into an 
accusative. The problem of how to make these two groups of case-endings 
correspond to the one pseudo-meaning karman has been elegantly solved in the 
A∑†ådhyåy¥ with the help of P. 2.3.1: anabhihite. (Many examples illustrating the 
working of this rule can be found in Joshi, 1975: 22-4.) No such elegant solution 
has been found in the cases where the nominative does not become an accusative. 
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An instance is måtå smaryate, which has as its active counterpart måtu˙ smarati. 
See P. 2.3.52. 
 3.  Combinations of these first two kinds of irregularities also occur. Thus 
the passive pitå saµjñåyate corresponds to two active sentences. See P. 2.3.22. 
 The kåraka device does not only facilitate the transition from real meanings 
to case-endings. It also does good work in describing the meanings to be 
expressed by primary suffixes and compounds. See Singh 1974: 299-302. (Singh 
is of the opinion that also secondary suffixes represent kårakas. This is doubtful.) 
This does not, however, change the fact that the kåraka device was introduced 
with an eye to the case-endings. This is shown by the circumstance that each 
group of case-endings corresponds to one kåraka category. (The genitive case 
takes a special position and does not count here.) 
 Our short survey of the kåraka device can be summed up as follows. Kåraka 
names are pseudo-meanings which have been introduced to facilitate the 
transition from real meanings to case-endings. Such a device was needed, because 
no one-to-one correspondence between real meanings and groups of case-endings 
exists. This exceptional behaviour of the Sanskrit language (if we wish to call it 
thus) is the reason of existence of the kåraka device. 
 We note that, in view of the above, it is incorrect to think that, say, karman 
really means kartur ¥psitatamam (see P. 1.4.49), while yaµ prati kopa˙ gets the 
appellation karman due to the unfortunately exceptional behaviour of the Sanskrit 
language. This would be missing the point. Had the language been well-behaved, 
there would have been no need for a kåraka device, and the term karman would 
not be found in the grammar; kartur ¥psitatamam would have sufficed. 
 The six pseudo-meanings will from now on go by the name “pseudo-
elements”. To distinguish them from real semantic elements, two pairs of [154] 
hooks (<< >>) will be used. The six pseudo-elements are: <<kart®>>, 
<<karman>>, <<karaˆa>>, <<sampradåna>>, <<apådåna>>, <<adhikaraˆa>>. 
 I conclude this subsection by contrasting the kåraka device with another 
buffer device in the A∑†ådhyåy¥, which exists in the so-called lakåras. The lakåras 
are used in the formation of verbal forms. A vital distinction is that kårakas are 
pseudo-meanings, whereas the lakåras are pseudo-forms. I can think of two 
reasons that may explain this difference in treatment: 1: The lakåras, unlike the 
kårakas, unite different meanings at one an the same time; e.g., in the formation of 
bhavati the two meanings kart® (by P. 3.4.69) and vartamåna (by P. 3.2.123) are 
jointly expressed by lAÈ. 2. The original meanings “shine through” the lakåras. 
E.g., in the formation of bhËyate, the meaning bhåva is still required to get the 
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vikaraˆa yaK (by P. 3.1.67). In the case of the kårakas, on the other hand, the 
pseudo-meanings “cover” the original meanings. That is to say, once the original 
meanings have been replaced by pseudo-meanings, those original meanings play 
no role any longer. 
 
2.3.  What bearing has the kåraka device on the question how large utterances are 
produced by Påˆini’s grammar? In order to arrive at an answer, we shall study 
some concrete derivations. 
 It can easily be verified that the semantic elements underlying ak∑ån d¥vyati 
puru∑a˙ “the man plays dice” are: <kr¥∂å>, <puru∑a>, <eka>, <vartamåna>, 
<svatantra>, <ak∑a>, <bahu> and <sådhakatama>. It is further clear that the three 
elements <ak∑a>, <bahu> and <sådhakatama> correspond to the word ak∑ån, 
while <kr¥∂å>, <puru∑a>, <eka>, <vartamåna>, <svatantra> correspond to the two 
words d¥vyati puru∑a˙. For reasons similar to the ones we found in the case of 
tvaµ bhavasi, the second group of semantic elements cannot again be split into 
two. As a result, the semantic elements underlying ak∑ån d¥vyati puru∑a˙ fall 
automatically into two groups, as follows: {<kr¥∂å> <puru∑a> <eka> 
<vartamåna> svatantra>} {<ak∑a> <bahu> <sådhakatama>}. At first sight, 
therefore, it seems that the derivations of ak∑ån and of d¥vyati puru∑a˙ are 
independent of each other. 
 Unfortunately, this first impression is wrong. As long as we do not know 
that the meaning <sådhakatama> stands in the relation to the verbal root div, there 
is no chance of obtaining the desired accusative case-ending. Only when 
accompanied by that verbal root can this case-ending be realized, by P. 1.4.43. 
We must conclude that the group of semantic elements <ak∑a>, <bahu>, 
<sådhakatama> in isolation cannot give rise to any utterance whatever. That is to 
say, in spite of the fact that in the above example all semantic elements fall of 
their own into two groups, this does not mean that those two groups are 
independent of each other. It seems indeed that Påˆini’s grammar as a rule derives 
whole sentences, and combinations of sentences. 
[155] At this point we must take the kåraka device into account. If, in the above 
example, we replace semantic elements by pseudo-elements wherever possible, 
we get the following two groups: {<kr¥∂å> <puru∑a> <eka> <vartamåna> 
<<kart®>>} {<ak∑a> <bahu> <<karman>>}. 
 The difference from our earlier two groups seems negligible. Instead of 
<svatantra> there, we have here <<kart®>>; and for <sådhakatama> there, here we 
find <<karman>>. But this small difference has an important effect. Whereas the 
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group {<ak∑a> <bahu> <sådhakatama>} could not, on its own, give rise to an 
utterance, the new group {<ak∑a> <bahu> <<karman>>} can. In other words, this 
group has gained independence. In order to derive ak∑ån, we need nothing beyond 
the group {<ak∑a> <bahu> <<karman>>}. We do not even need to know the 
activity with respect to which dice, ak∑ån, are karman. 
 A second example may further clarify my point. The following two 
sentences derive from almost the same semantic elements: 
1. puru∑åya krudhyåmy aham 
2. puru∑am abhikrudhyåmy aham 
Indeed, both these sentences can be translated “I am angry with the man”. The 
semantic elements, arranged into groups, are respectively: 
1. {<puru∑a> <yaµ prati kopa˙1> <eka>} {<kopa2> <asmad> <vartamåna> 
<eka> svatantra>} 
[156] 
2. {<puru∑a> <yaµ prati kopa˙1> <eka>} {<abhi> <kopa2> <asmad> 
<vartamåna> <eka> svatantra>} 
Index numbers are used to indicate the elements of different groups which belong 
together. 
 As was the case in our earlier example, we are here again confronted with a 
group of semantic elements which, by itself, is not in a position to produce a 
Sanskrit utterance. Here the group is: 
 {<puru∑a> <yaµ prati kopa˙> <eka>} 
Indeed, this single group must in one case give rise to puru∑åya, in another to 
puru∑am. Which of these two forms is to be chosen depends entirely on the 
context in which our group occurs. When the verbal root expressive of anger is 
krudh and is employed without a preposition, the dative must be used. When this 
same verbal root is employed together with a preposition, the accusative is 
correct. This we learn from P. 1.4.37-8. 
 Let us now use pseudo-meanings instead of real meanings wherever 
possible. The two sentences under discussion then appear to derive from: 
1. {<puru∑a> <<sampradåna>> <eka>} {<kopa> <asmad> <vartamåna> 
<eka> <<kart®>>} 
2. {<puru∑a> <<karman>> <eka>} {<abhi> <kopa> <asmad> <vartamåna> 
<eka> <<kart®>>} 
These two sets of semantic elements no longer have a group in common, as they 
did when we used only real meanings. The groups are now different, and 
therefore give rise to different utterances (puru∑åya and puru∑am respectively). 
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Again the groups have gained independence, in the sense that no information 
from outside the group is required in order to be able to derive an utterance from 
it. 
 These few examples must suffice to show that Påˆini’s grammar primarily 
generates whole sentences (or even combinations of sentences), but that the 
kåraka device enables us to find sets of semantic elements (which now include 
pseudo-elements) that give rise to parts of whole sentences. 
 
3.  The outcome of our investigation can be summed up in two points. 1 
Påˆini’s grammar turns meanings into utterances. 2 As a result we must assume 
that this grammar primarily generates sentences, or even groups of sentences. 
 I have nothing to add to the first point. I know of no grounds to doubt its 
validity. I am less certain about the second point. It is true that a simple and 
straightforward application of Påˆini’s grammar will as a rule produce sentences, 
not single words. But this fact may not fully settle the issue. 
 Imagine that Påˆini wanted to write a grammar that would produce single 
words on the basis of a semantic input. What semantic elements would underlie, 
say, bhavasi? If one tries to answer this question, he will realize how much 
trouble Påˆini saved himself by bringing the accompanying word tvam into the 
picture. Similarly, in assigning meanings to case-endings, one is bound to take the 
context into consideration. 
 I therefore propose the following. The evidence at our disposal strongly 
suggests that Påˆini’s grammar produces, as a rule, whole sentences (or groups of 
them). We stick to the conclusion that it indeed primarily produces whole 
sentences until and unless evidence to the contrary is procured. 
 One final remark. The presupposition that underlies Påˆini’s grammar as we 
have come to know it, is that the meaning of an utterance is equal to the sum of 
the meanings of its parts. A consequence of this would be that also preverbs are, 
by themselves, meaningful for Påˆini. There is some independent evidence to 
support this. When Påˆini informs us in P. 1.4.93 (adhipar¥ anarthakau) that adhi 
and pari are called karmapravacan¥ya provided they have no meaning, we 
conclude that adhi and pari do have meaning in other circumstances, i.e. when 
they are ordinary preverbs (upasarga). On the other hand, sometimes meanings 
are ascribed to roots which can only be expressed by those roots in combination 
with preverbs (Bronkhorst, 1981). This suggests that the preverbs somehow 
participate in the meanings of the [157] verbal roots. Since this question needs 
further study, I shall say no more about it. 
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